CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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9 April 1970
ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. I. KOMIVES (Hungary)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
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	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
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	Mr. C. GEORGESCO

Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
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	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. THE CHAIRMAN (Hungary): I declare open the 463rd plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The debate in our Committee so far this year on the vital question of attaining an international ban that goes beyond the existing ban in the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) on the use of biological and chemical means of warfare and extends to prohibitions in regard to their production, stockpiling, etc. has been a dynamic one. We are in the course of obtaining important clarifications as to several of the issues involved, technically complicated and politically vexing as they are. Several delegations have offered concrete suggestions for solutions. I believe we should push this process of clarification further before we settle down to try to agree on precise legal language. With the aim of continuing those "mapping expeditions", as I have ventured to call the preparatory work (CCD/PV.450, para.53), I intend today to dwell particularly on the thorny issue of verification.

3. Let me say first that we must, as always when exploring possible methods of verifying compliance with any measures of disarmament, avoid the risk of setting such standards of perfection that the proposal is effectively killed the moment it is put forward. The majority of speakers have spoken in general terms of the need for verification. But we must surely beware of stating too categorically that verification is indispensable lest progress be deadlocked. We have authoritative statements to prove that it is possible to forgo control. I am thinking of the unilateral pledges by some nations about refraining from production of certain chemical and biological weapons. In the case of the United States this refers to a total prohibition of production and stockpiling, together with the final elimination of all biological agents and one chemical type of agent -- namely toxins -- without referring to any need for reciprocity or verification. In the case of Canada we have an equally unconditional declaration of non-possession and also the renunciation for the future of the development, production, acquisition or stockpiling of all biological weapons and all chemical ones, with a reservation concerning just one of the latter, namely riot-control agents, the position of which is left unclarified (CCD/PV.460, para.37). No request for reciprocity or for a system of verification is made in this context.

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I should add that only the formal withdrawal of the reservation about retaliation which Canada made in regard to the use of these weapons when ratifying the Geneva Protocol is made contingent upon the attainment of "effective and verifiable agreements" (ibid.). More countries may be expected to be ready for unilateral, unconditional renunciation of chemical and biological means of warfare without raising the question of verification. It would of course be particularly welcomed if the action taken by the United States were emulated by the other major Powers.

4. While it has thus been demonstrated that a wide door is kept promisingly open for considerable progress by national decisions to surrender unconditionally the right to possess chemical and biological weapons, it nevertheless remains the task of this Committee to elaborate internationally-binding multilateral agreements, preferably universal in scope and covering all agents without exception. It is within that framework that we have to study to what degree verification is essential and in what forms it may be realistically implemented.

5. Again, a warning note must be struck against over-reliance on perfectibility. Or, to quote the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vratuša:

> "If we compare the risk involved in imperfect control with the risk involved in the continuation of the present danger of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the truth will be confirmed once again that the former danger is far less than the latter." (CCD/PV.456, para.36)

Verification can never be and need not be 100 per cent effective. What is required is a sufficiently high probability of detection to provide deterrence on one side and reassurance on the other. One might discuss, as has been done in the SIPRI study on verification,[1] a 50 per cent probability of detection as constituting a sufficiently high barrier of deterrence against cheating. Even this figure might, however, be too high to be realistic in the sense that it would call for more intensive monitoring than is likely to be acceptable to all prospective adherents to an agreement. One might discuss the figure of 30 per cent or even 10 per cent as constituting a sufficient barrier.

6. My colleagues may remember that in the discussion we had earlier in this Committee on the problem of verification in connexion with the comprehensive test ban the Swedish delegation offered some suggestions for a solution based on a

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1/ The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, part IV - Verification.

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statistical method of evaluation and applying modern decision theories. I refer particularly to the working paper we put forward in July 1967 (ENDC/191). For the calculations referred to in that paper we placed the disclosure probability level at 10 per cent, meaning that a prospective violator would have to face one chance in ten of being exposed. This level, we estimated, would be high enough to deter States from violations in view of the considerable political costs involved in a disclosure. That figure was later challenged, particularly by the United States delegation, as being too low. I want today, however, to draw attention, not so much to any specific percentage figure as to the scientific logic we then followed in order to show that the basic problem of obtaining reasonable assurance coupled with reliable deterrence is a common one which we meet whenever we try to draw up a disarmament or an arms-control measure. This is so because the essential feature is always a substantive obligation of a negative character; in the case we are now discussing an obligation not to develop, manufacture or stockpile chemical and biological means of warfare.

7. The main objective of any verification procedure is that it should generate mutual trust. Whenever dealing with matters of verification, the Swedish delegation has argued for the necessity of relying on two basic principles intended to create that mutual trust and make it grow, namely (a) the principle of open information and (b) the principle of internationalization.

8. A lead in the same direction, more specifically as to the value of openness, has been given by President Nixon when announcing the spectacular renunciatory action taken last autumn. In regard to biological weapons he declared in his statement of 25 November 1969 that the United States would confine its research in this field to immunization and safety measures. It was also said that the military research laboratories would be transferred to civilian agencies concerned with research in such important peaceful fields as immunization and protection against diseases. Further, disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons was promised. In February of this year similar action was taken in regard to toxins, mostly regarded as chemical warfare agents. This series of measures thus announced by the United States would seem to ensure full openness for the future as to research, development, production and stockpiling in that country of biological means of warfare and of toxins.

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9. The representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vratuša, made the suggestion in his speech on 10 March to which I have already referred that all States should place their institutions engaged in chemical and biological weapon research, development and production under civilian administration, for instance by their respective ministries of health (CCD/PV.456, para.35).

10. The initiative to this effect taken in the United States and similar initiatives which have been or may be taken in other countries will become of immense importance for increasing the quality of life on our planet. Microbiology is a fast-growing part of the "life" sciences which help us to conquer dreaded diseases. All such efforts are particularly important for that majority of inhabitants of the globe who live in so-called developing countries. The continuing fight against disease, malnutrition and hunger, in which the scientists concerned with microbiology take a leading part, concerns those countries in a most direct way. If seen in this light, our efforts to stop all development for military uses of the biological agents take on their full meaning. And this is also true of many chemical agents which combat attacks by mould, insects and other parasites on our crops and other foodstuffs and promote development of new means of nutrition such as proteins and vitamins. The possibilities of improving life would become greatly enhanced if we refrained from producing all these agents for the purpose of the death and destruction of man.

11. If, as an exercise in formulating possible solutions, the Swedish delegation were now to attempt to sketch an international verification system for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapon production etc., we would place the requirement of open information as the first and fundamental element. But let me add immediately that we recognize the political difficulty of reporting on weapons, that is on chemical and biological agents which have become "weaponized", ready as munitions. On the other hand, we see great positive value in open reporting on the agents themselves.

12. This distinction becomes of paramount importance when we have to decide on the legal formulae for our prospective prohibitory regulations. I hope my colleagues will agree with me that we need a kind of twofold approach, as in the non-proliferation Treaty where article II prohibits the acquisition of "nuclear weapons" while article III on safeguards focuses upon "source or special fissionable material" (ENDC/226*). The principal article in a treaty on chemical and biological weapons likewise would probably have to prohibit the production and possession of weapons themselves. On the other hand, subsidiary regulations would have to be introduced dealing with the

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production etc. of agents, possibly in some language such as "agents which constitute possible components of chemical and biological weapons", but also with the important proviso in some such terms as "except for specified peaceful purposes" -- and I would like to emphasize "specified peaceful" purposes. Such a pattern would make it possible to take into consideration the distinction I advocated in my last intervention on this subject on 12 March between what I called unconditional and conditional prohibition, the latter intended to cover the situation in regard to substances having considerable peaceful uses (CCD/PV.457, para.44 et seq.). The open reporting which we are suggesting as the basic element of verification would also be concerned with the agents rather than with weapons.

13. In regard to biological agents a requirement for open information could immediately be made all-inclusive. With research and development as well as production limited to laboratory requirements for protective purposes, all need for secrecy would seem to disappear. On the contrary, unrestricted publication of scientific and technical work aimed at the international community would open the benefits to the whole world, as I have just indicated. The fight against disease is of universal interest. In particular, countries more developed in biological science and technology would be given better opportunity for sharing their results with countries lacking comparable research resources.

14. A similar course of action could be followed in large part in regard to chemical agents. A number of these have no civilian application, including all toxins, most nerve agents such as tabun, sarin, soman; all blister agents, such as sulphur and nitrogen mustards; and psychochemicals such as LSD. In addition, however, certain other chemical agents have a wide use for both military and civilian production. In this latter case secrecy may be a prerequisite for profitable commercial production. The form and content of the information would obviously have to be different in these cases.

15. I think the advice of experts would be needed on how such reporting as we may agree upon should be detailed for different agents in both the chemical and the biological fields, that is in regard to transmitting publications on scientific research and to government notifications concerning the flow of chemical and biological agents from production to different uses. One might possibly apply some relevant indicators, such as the number of personnel engaged in certain activities, the figures for sales, or other measurable factors. Several delegations

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have already mentioned the need for experts to come together to present us in the next few months with detailed information on various technical aspects of the problems of verification. I would like once again to add the voice of the Swedish delegation to the support of these suggestions.

16. I just said that "open information" seems to us to be one of the pillars of a verification system, the second being "internationalization". What we feel to be strictly necessary is an obligatory international reporting system applying to both qualitative and quantitative factors, that is both as to new developments and as to bulk of production. To include in the text of a treaty an obligation for governments to report continuously or periodically would seem to be essential in connexion with the prohibition, as envisaged, of the acquisition of chemical and biological means of warfare. The detailed procedures, particularly as to how to deal with "agents produced for specified peaceful purposes", might be laid down in an accompanying protocol annexed to the treaty, both because various agents have to be treated differently -- the demarcation line, however, not lying entirely between chemical and biological agents as separate categories -- and because expectations of technological changes call for a type of agreement which could be amended more rapidly and easily than the fundamental rules of the treaty itself.

17. A definite hurdle so far has been the selection of the proper international organ which should be given the duty of receiving, storing and preferably analysing and distributing the information contained in the reports. For the biological agents and for some chemical agents the World Health Organization may seem to be a natural choice as it already has the essential technical know-how. For some other chemical agents, particularly those going through industrial production for civilian uses, it is more difficult to indicate a focal point in the international system of agencies and organs. The Food and Agriculture Organization may be one possibility. In the final instance, when the prohibition of chemical and biological means of warfare has become part and parcel of general and complete disarmament, there will of course be available a specialized disarmament agency, the international disarmament organization provided for in the general draft treaties of 1962 (ENDC/2/Rev.1, ENDC/30 and Add.1-3). But even before that there will be an obvious need to enlist the co-operation of scientists specialized in the various fields concerned, and possibly also their international organizations. That, again, belongs to the questions calling for further penetration.

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18. The willingness to report, openly and internationally, on national activities related to development and production of chemical and biological agents seems to us to be the indispensable first requirement in a verification system. A second part might be an agreed complaints procedure, containing further possibilities of obtaining assurances that circumvention was not taking place. The question if, and in what form, that should in turn be followed by a procedure for applying sanctions I shall deal with a little later. That is usually part of a different article in similar treaties, most often in the form of a right of withdrawal. The complaints procedure, on the other hand, should definitely be part of the verification system. We have had occasion to amplify that view in considerable — and we hope constructive — detail in another context, under the label "verification by challenge". I refer to the working paper put forward by my delegation on 1 April 1969 outlining possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/242).

19. The United Kingdom draft treaty on biological warfare (ENDC/255/Rev.1) presents, albeit in an abridged form, just such a method of clarifying suspicious events or activities. The procedure suggested in its article III, paragraph 1, appears to us in its general outline to be a valuable one. The United Kingdom draft does not provide for queries directly from one party to another party. That may be based on the argument that the right to raise such queries always exists. We considered it valuable however — in the different context mentioned — that there should be established an obligation on the other party "to co-operate in good faith for the clarification of all events pertaining to the subject matter of [the] Treaty" (ENDC/242, article II).

20. Whether it is preferable, as the United Kingdom draft suggests, instead to turn immediately to an international organ depends, of course, on (a) whether such an organ is entrusted with a specified function in relation to the treaty and (b) whether that organ -- or perhaps the Secretary-General of the United Nations -- has at its disposal the experts needed for investigating complaints. Anyway, even if a shortened procedure should be prescribed, we would favour the complaints being lodged with the Secretary-General rather than directly with the Security Council, and the automatic procedure of investigating complaints being made applicable to suspected cases of breach of the prohibitions on production, stockpiling, etc., as to our minds the prospective treaty should not concentrate on complaints about use of chemical and biological weapons.

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21. It would seem to us preferable that lodging a complaint with the Security Council should be treated as a separate possibility, to be utilized at the discretion of the complaining party after the results of the investigation by experts had been submitted: this in order not to make complaints "political" and perhaps incriminating at an early stage and also in order to separate the functions of investigation and political judgement. The Swedish delegation, prima visia, prefers a procedure in several stages which gradually, and with increasing seriousness, would seek clarification and thereby as far as possible help to reduce tensions and avoid denunciations. Again we are reminded how much more flexibly, and at the same time adequately, complaints procedures would be handled if we had arrived at such a stage of general and complete disarmament that there was an international disarmament organization in operation. Be that as it may, we can see that there might be a need for a Security Council function of judging and, in cases warranting it, deciding on sanctions.

22. Other delegations may wish to suggest other methods of verification than the ones I have just outlined, particularly if they have in mind other targets for control. I have not wanted to exclude any verification methods on which general agreement could be reached, but in this statement I have concentrated on those elements of a verification system which would seem to us to be primarily necessary for incorporation in the legal instrument which is to constitute an agreed ban on production, etc., of chemical and biological weapons.

23. Obviously there are available many other modalities for obtaining security. They include aerial surveillance of field testing, information on training, analysis of budgetary provisions, inspection teams, etc. It has seemed to my delegation that such control methods, which are already to some extent applied by national agencies, would with a growing improvement in the climate of trust come to be voluntarily used more and more, first bilaterally and then, perhaps, also regionally. While such a development should be encouraged it would seem to us premature to prescribe immediately a fully-fledged system of any of those methods for compulsory use by an international organ. That would, inter alia, involve considerable costs in terms of financial resources, in terms of experts and in terms of political discomfort. It may well come to pass that as we in the Committee on Disarmament continue to study the possibilities of verification some of those methods may have proved their diagnostic

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importance, their practical feasibility and their political acceptability, so that they can be included in our general agreement. The main thing at this juncture must be to proceed jointly and in confident co-operation with a relentless search for solutions acceptable to all delegations.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 463rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Imre Könives, representative of Hungary.

"A statement was made by the representative of Sweden.

"The following document was circulated: letter dated 30 March 1970 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting General Assembly document A/7967 (CCD/284).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 14 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.464
14 April 1970
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Chairman: Mr. M.A. HUSAIN (India)

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United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.R. DAY
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKCVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the 464th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. As Chairman of the day it is my very pleasant duty to welcome among us this morning His Excellency the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Winiewicz. We are indeed happy to see him here and in fact have been for some time awaiting his joining us. I now call upon Mr. Winiewicz to take the floor.

2. Mr. WINIEWICZ (Poland): First I want to express my cordial thanks for the words of welcome which you, Mr. Chairman, have addressed to me, words which I probably do not deserve although on the instructions of my Government I have to follow the work of this Committee. It seems that in my capacity as Deputy Foreign Minister I have been too lazy to come sufficiently often to this Conference. May I be excused on the simple understanding that the work of the Committee is neither new nor strange to me and that I follow its work with the greatest attention and greet any progress with the greatest appreciation.

3. If you will permit me, Mr. Chairman, before I start my speech on the working paper which has been distributed in the name of my delegation, among others, I should like to address a few words to the United States delegation to convey our best wishes that the difficulties which the crew of Apollo 13 is meeting may be overcome and that the mission may be if not a complete success at least a partial one. Best wishes go to those now struggling in the cosmos for the success of the mission they have undertaken.

4. The main purpose of my statement is the introduction of the working paper (CCD/285) presented by the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland, and already distributed to you, concerning the safeguard clause of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons. I would recall th t this draft convention was submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations by nine socialist countries in document A/7655. Before commenting on the details of our working paper I cannot resist dwelling for a moment on some general problems directly and indirectly connected with chemical and bacteriological warfare.

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5. The main problem which has occupied this Committee's attention so far has been whether to proceed with the consideration of chemical and bacteriological weapons jointly or to deal with the bacteriological category of weapons separately. My Government is firmly persuaded that the problem before us is neither procedural nor technical: it remains a problem of a political and a fundamental character.

6. Until 1964 no scientific organization or political agency had advocated any separate consideration of chemical or bacteriological (biological) means of warfare. One cannot fail to notice that a discussion restricted to biological warfare started only when substantiated accusations of the use of chemical weapons in the Viet Nam conflict were made public. Such use of a variety of chemical agents has led to a number of political actions condemning, in severe terms, that type of warfare. In that connexion, articles published by the London Observer on 26 May, 2 June and 16 June 1968 disclosed facts concerning research on chemical and biological weapons which was being conducted at Porton Down in the United Kingdom. A further series of articles evoked the indignant reaction of public opinion in the United Kingdom against the use of gas in Viet Nam, particularly when it became obvious that such g was being produced in the United States under a United Kingdom licence.

7. That new situation gave rise to an urgent and one might even say universal demand to strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) and to search for ways and means of preventing activities of the type undertaken in Viet N In addition to the existing rules of war as contained in the Geneva Protocol, proposals falling within the scope of disarmament have been advanced by large group of scientists and by political organizations in different regions of the world, the United States and the United Kingdom not excluded.

8. Motivated by the same spirit, the Hungarian delegation submitted to the twenty first session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution whereby the Assembly, guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter and of contemporar international law, considering that weapons of mass destruction constituted a dange to all mankind and recalling that the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare had been signed and adopted and was recognized

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by many States, (i) called for strict and absolute compliance by all States with the principles and norms established by the Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; (ii) condemned all actions aimed at the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; and (iii) declared that the use of those weapons for the purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constituted an international crime (A/6529, para.5).

9. As we all know, one of the major Powers, not a party to the Geneva Protocol, brought to bear the full weight of its influence in order to restrict the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol and in order to eliminate the condemnatory clauses of the Hungarian draft resolution. That line of action was in effect the beginning of a drive which aimed objectively at weakening the almost universally recognized comprehensive interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Maltese proposal submitted to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, calling for the revision and bringing up to date of the Protocol (A/7017, para.4(a) and (c)) and the United Kingdom proposal of 1968 advocating the separate consideration of biological means of warfare (ENDC/231*) are momentous stepping stones leading in what we believe to be the wrong direction. The United Kingdom representative thought that as far as chemical warfare was concerned we should remain satisfied with the Geneva Protocol, and as support for further action in this area he suggested that the Secretary-General should be requested to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects exclusively of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use (ENDC/PV.381, para.92). Thus after more than forty years of a remarkable record in the defence of the comprehensive interpretation of the Geneva Protocol the United Kingdom Government took steps which indeed endangered the value and effectiveness of the Protocol.

10. Permit me also to recall that it was the Polish delegation that then suggested that the requested study should cover both chemical and bacteriological weapons (ENDC/PV.385, para.70), and we have not failed to note with satisfaction that every member of the Committee, including the delegation of the United Kingdom, has joined in support of the Polish proposal.

11. We now have the opportunity of studying and considering the Secretary-General's report (A/7575/Rev.1) which covers, from the technical and scientific points of view, all the various aspects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons -- their basic characteristics, potential toxicity, speed of action, duration of effects, and indeed all the unpredictable dangers that their use in war might bring to mankind. Everyone who has spoken on this subject in this Committee and at the United Nations

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General Assembly has evaluated the report as a good basis for fruitful discussions and for the elaboration of sound measures to eliminate effectively those weapons of mass annihilation.

12. We of Poland were especially appreciative of two main inferences of the report: viz. (a) that chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons clearly belong to one and the same class of means of mass destruction and (b) that the universal elimination of those weapons could in no way weaken the security of any nation. These two conclusions are of particular import when viewed in the light of the argumentation advanced in favour of the United Kingdom draft convention dealing solely with biological weapons (ENDC/255/Rev.1). We note, not without satisfaction, that one of the major merits of the Secretary-General's report lies in its recognition of the significance of the Geneva Protocol. When discussing the report, Poland has expressed its unequivocal endorsement of the recommendations of the Secretary-General on further action to be taken to deal with the threat posed by the existence of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

13. We are now able to benefit also from two additional and diligently documented expert studies. I have in mind the report of the WHO group of consultants[1/] and the extremely timely and highly competent study of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute[2/]. Of course our mandate concerning problems of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare has been defined in General Assembly resolution 2603 A (XXIV) (CCD/275), as to the scope and the proper interpretation of the Geneva Protocol, and in General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV), in which the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to seeking and reaching agreement on prohibition and on other measures aimed at securing an effective and complete ban on those extremely dangerous means of warfare.

14. Finally, permit me to state that of all the many international documents dealing with chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons since the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, whether emanating from intergovernmental agencies, political sources or scientific organizations, including the League of Nations and the United Nations, only one document, the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 10 July 1969 (ENDC/255) tends to divide the issue generally recognized as indivisible, and indivisible it remains.

1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Report of a WHO Group of Consultants, Geneva, 1970.

2/ The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare.

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15. I venture to admit frankly that I feel guilty of having abused the indulgence of this Committee by a prolonged analysis of the two different approaches to the question of chemical and bacteriological warfare. But I have endeavoured to demonstrate which of the two approaches is likely to produce the results requested from us by resolution 2603 A and B (XXIV). Either we concentrate our efforts to ban effectively and unconditionally all chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare, thus contributing to disarmament, or we indirectly, by omission, justify the miscalculated and dangerous policy of the continued use of chemical means of warfare, whatever benevolent explanation the users of such weapons might give.

16. As always, my delegation has listened attentively to the views expressed here on this very question.

17. The representative of the United States, in his statement on 17 March, with his usual eloquence, all my colleagues have told me, demonstrated convincingly that in the present circumstances biological means of warfare cannot be used as a practical method of conducting a war; they do not represent any retaliatory value since their destructive potential cannot be limited and in consequence they can affect the aggressor as well as the victim of aggression (CCD/PV.458, para.51 et seq.). My delegation finds no difficulty in agreeing with the view that because of their nature biological weapons are very unlikely to be used.

18. On the other hand, not only are we now facing the danger of chemical warfare but, as we all know, chemical methods are already being applied in an armed conflict taking place today. Therefore the obvious and logical conclusion is immediately to start negotiations which would lead to the elimination of chemical means of warfare in the first place, at the same time solving the problem of eliminating all biological means of warfare, a task which, it seems to be agreed, appears easier to achieve.

19. Some delegations have endeavoured to persuade us that chemical weapons are of a tactical character and therefore their use is limited to battlefield operations. Meanwhile Mr. Leonard in his statement of 17 March provided us with convincing evidence of the damage which might possibly be caused by an aircraft carrying an atomic, a biological or a chemical charge (ibid., para.50). This example constitutes a clear reminder that chemical means of warfare are used by the belligerent which has acquired air supremacy. Indeed, such was the case in Ethiopia and China in the thirties, and we are observing the same in Viet Nam

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today. The most repulsive element is that this is still going on, after the military have ascertained that there is not the slightest chance for the opposite side to retaliate. No less repugnant is the fact that chemical weapons have been used against peoples fighting for their national liberation, who do not usually possess the simplest means of defence and are deprived of the material capability usually, as we well know, at the disposal of the regular armies of highly developed countries. What importance could possibly be attached to whether we qualify this weapon as strategic or tactical? It remains an instrument of mass extermination. One can state without any doubt that there is no politically admissible or militarily justifiable reason which could support the preservation of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons in national armouries.

20. Several delegations, and mainly Lord Chalfont in his statement of 7 April, (CCD/PV.462, para.15 et seq.) spoke at length on all the differences which exist between chemical and biological weapons. It would not, of course, be too difficult to prove, as has already been done by the delegations of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovaki and Bulgaria, that those differences are emphasized simply to separate the consideration of issues of chemical and biological weapons. An equal or even greater number of arguments can be presented in order to stress the absolute sameness of those categories of weapons. One can at the same time demonstrate with equal success that there are differences in the production, methods of use and destructive effects of each and every kind of bacteriological weapon. Does this mean that a separate convention for each type of such weapons would be advisable?

21. It remains therefore to decide that the question of separate or joint consideration of chemical and biological weapons is dictated not by technical or procedural factors but by the specific political and military considerations of individual States. Mankind could not profit from such an approach, disarmament processes might be slowed down and the community of nations would suffer in the end.

22. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Chalfont, for having reiterated in his statement of 7 April 1970, which I have already mentioned, that the United Kingdom delegation remains "ready to fall in with the wish of the majority to discuss the prospects for progress on biological and chemical weapons together" (CCD/PV.462, para.6). Regrettably, the speaker weakened that statement by concluding that "it is better to have an agreement on biological weapons than no agreement at all" (ibid., para.31).

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The last phrase might indicate a lack of confidence in the possibilities of reaching a rapid understanding on a difficult matter. But our Committee has not been created to solve only easy problems; it has to tackle difficult and crucial disarmament problems, and particularly those ripe for solution. I submit that it is precisely the question of the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and chemical weapons that is ripe for conclusive decision.

23. We of Poland would not dare to assume that the statement of the United Kingdom delegate had the characteristics of an ultimatum because then the Committee's work might find itself at an impasse as a result of the uncompromising attitude of a small group of States. Let us exclude such a possibility and avoid a situation in which the self-righteousness of a minority might destroy a wise policy fully grasped by the majority. After hearing the statements of practically all the members of this Committee it has become obvious that the overwhelming majority definitely favour joint treatment of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.

24. I shall now proceed to make a few comments on our working paper (CCD/285), which has just been distributed, and I will do this in connexion with certain articles of the draft convention contained in document A/7655.

25. The system of complaints embodied in our proposal now before you has been inspired to a large extent by the provisions on verification formulated in the United Kingdom draft convention dealing with biological warfare alone. By referring all problems having a direct impact on the security of nations to the Security Council we are making proper use of the only organ of the United Nations which has the power to enforce necessary decisions and is authorized to undertake such forms of investigation as are necessary and derive from the character of the complaint.

26. In the second paragraph of the proposed new article we state the obligation of every State party to the convention to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which might be decided upon by the Security Council. Should the Security Council decide, for example, on the need for an on-site inspection, then of course that inspection should be carried out. A very interesting suggestion, in my view, for securing speedy action in such a circumstance was put forward here by the representative of Japan in his statement of 10 March. He proposed that a roster of experts on biological and chemical warfare be prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to be used for on-site inspection should the need arise (CCD/PV.456, para.82). The Polish delegation will not fail to give this proposal more thorough analysis.

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27. When we speak of a system of verification and control our primary concern must be to ensure that this remains within the scope of obligations assumed under the treaty. In proposing the said addition to the draft convention we are fully aware of the fact that any system of complaint and verification must be credible and must inspire confidence in order to avert suspicion on the part of any one of the signatories. On the other hand, we must always bear in mind that when seeking the most perfect methods of compliance with any measure of disarmament political realism should remain our guide if we really desire to make progress. Indeed, we fully share the view expressed by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her statement on 9 April 1970 that "the main objective of any verification procedure is that it should generate mutual trust," (CCD/PV.463, para.7). We agree with this and accept it to be the very essence of co-operation. Based on good will it may prove to be the most efficient if not the only way to solve differences that might arise in the future between parties to the convention.

28. We also accept the view of the representative of Sweden that a complaints procedure does not ensure full, positive observance of the provisions of the convention by all the parties concerned (ibid., para.3 et seq.). But we should like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that in the last two preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution of the Security Council proposed in our working paper we twice stress the necessity to undertake proper steps to ensure strict compliance with the obligations stemming from the convention. That means that the Security Council, in accordance with its statutory function deriving from the United Nations Charter, would be in a position to take all appropriate steps resulting from the process of the investigation so that any would-be violator would have no chance of escaping sanctions.

29. We well know that there are delegations which hesitate to rely solely on the Security Council on questions relating to the application of safeguard measures because of the veto power of its permanent members -- or should I say rather because of the provisions for consensus among the major Powers. We would not argue that one could not conceive theoretically a more sophisticated and effective system of security than that provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. But, let us face it, no better system of security has been worked out so far and we doubt whether

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the foreseeable future will bring changes in this respect. We are persuaded that the present system is valid and fully adequate for the purpose of a convention on chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare. On the other hand, we have to concede that in the past many painful problems of international relations remained unsolved and some still await solution, not because of any shortcomings of the Charter but simply as a result of insidious disregard by some Powers of its provisions and of the decisions of the Security Council.

30. The consideration of our working paper should be in no way separated from that of other provisions of the draft convention and in particular of its articles 5 and 6. Article 5 is an important instrument safeguarding compliance with the provisions of the convention. It provides for the early adoption and enforcement by States -- of course in accordance with their constitutional procedures -- of the necessary legislative and administrative measures pertaining to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to their destruction. One should not underestimate the importance of the subject matter and the enforcement power of its provisions. As in other well-known international instruments of that same type, the draft convention envisages the need to supplement international obligations of States by corresponding national and administrative measures.

31. A pertinent interpretation of administrative measures that may be undertaken in the fulfilment of the provisions of article 5 of the draft was spelled out by the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vratuša, in his statement on 10 March when he suggested that all States should place their institutions engaged in chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare research, development and production under civilian administration (CCD/PV.456, para.35). We are happy to know that this interpretation of article 5 has met with support from many speakers here.

32. Another possible important administrative measure connected with the implementation of article 5 of the draft convention might be the inclusion in the textbooks of schools and universities dealing with chemistry and biology of a precise indication that the use of any chemical formula or any biological agent for any warlike purposes constitutes a violation of international law and will be prosecuted in accordance with the appropriate national legislation. Every individual must become aware of the danger represented by chemical and bacteriological (biological)

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weapons and must be prepared for some form of participation in the enforcement of the convention prohibiting the development and production of those inhuman means of warfare.

33. I cannot of course abuse the patience of this Committee by multiplying examples of possible measures in this field. We are ready to co-operate in spelling out other possible practical measures to this end. In these considerations we are guided by our deep conviction of the necessity of mobilizing the masses of the peoples of the world against all the dangers of modern warfare in order that they may not be taken by surprise from ignorance of the lethal armoury sometimes built up by their own governments. As Mr. Gomulka said in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 1960:

> "It is of the utmost importance that mankind be fully aware of the dangers inherent in modern warfare. We have no right to conceal from the nations the truth about the real effects of nuclear arms and of weapons of mass destruction. On the contrary, we are in duty bound to spread this truth in order to make it easier for all nations to join their efforts in the struggle against the threat of war for general and complete disarmament."[1/]

Those remarks uttered in 1960 guided our delegation when it proposed a substantive report by the Secretary-General on the effects of atomic weapons and, more recently, of bacteriological and chemical weapons, and we have always advocated extremely wide distribution of this kind of information.

34. The undoubted value of the safeguard provisions contained in article 5 of the draft convention rests on the consciousness and awareness of millions of people, particularly those workers, farmers and technicians who are proud of their participation in the building of a better world, not in its utter destruction. Together with the scientists engaged in research and given the proper instrument of internal law their attitude can constitute a valuable guarantee that the convention now proposed by the socialist States will not be violated, and we hope that in this respect we are neither romantic nor unrealistic; we are feeling the importance of the pressure and attitude of public opinion.

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, fifteenth session (part I), plenary meetings, 874th meeting, para.91.

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35. The problem has been raised of how national enforcement could be carried out in different economic and social systems. This does not seem to be a great problem. When the interests of entire populations are at stake, when we are dealing with crucial problems of peace and human survival or utter destruction, the feelings and actions of individuals are very much the same irrespective of the political system under which they live. As far as we are concerned, I stress again that we firmly believe in their final judgement. And may I be permitted to say that we cling firmly to the principle enunciated by Lenin that "disarmament is the ideal of socialism". I say that because we are now approaching the one-hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth and it is all the more appropriate to reaffirm that for us, a socialist country, his heritage means not only disarmament but also the lessening of international tension, peaceful coexistence and peaceful co-operation, however greatly the ideas of Lenin and Marx may be twisted by their opponents.

36. What we are proposing is indeed a combination of international and domestic legal procedures which would make it extremely difficult to bypass the provisions of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.

37. In keeping with its position of principle, the Polish Government has always made proposals which would lead, we sincerely believe, to general and complete disarmament. That is the objective. Poland has lent its full support to measures to promote the achievement of this aim, and we are not easily discouraged in the pursuit of our aims. Although in the past there have been situations in which we could not feel encouraged by the reactions of the Western Powers to some of our proposals -- the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe in 1957,[1/] the proposal for freezing atomic weapons in Europe in 1963 (see ENDC/PV.189, p.6), and the proposal for the convocation of a European conference on security and co-operation in 1964[2/] -- we have never felt discouraged. This is particularly true in connexion with the last proposal concerning a European conference on security and co-operation. We are working hard to see that this is convened and to make it a success because we are still ready to explore, together with our socialist friends, every possibility of strengthening peace and

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1/ Ibid., twelfth session, plenary meetings, 697th meeting, paras. 136-137.

2/ Ibid., nineteenth session, plenary meetings, 1301st meeting, para.66.

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security. In this spirit of complete devotion to the tasks confronting us in this Committee we of Poland firmly believe that the proposal I have had the privilege to introduce to this Committee will be met with good will and an attitude of co-operation — well-known features of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

38. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): First of all may I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming wholeheartedly Comrade Winiewicz, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic, who notwithstanding the tight schedule of his work at home and elsewhere has come especially to address this Conference today. You, Comrade Minister, have so opportunely added the weight of your wisdom and your rich experience to our efforts to tackle the crucial problem on which you have just spoken with the great authority and clear vision always so characteristic of you.

39. My delegation is happy to be able to co-sponsor the important working paper on safeguards measures regarding the draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons (CCD/285) which Minister Winiewicz has just presented. The Mongolian delegation feels greatly honoured to be associated with the delegations of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Polish People's Republic, whose timely and valuable initiatives have been extremely instrumental in making the world community aware of the growing danger of chemical and bacteriological warfare and in getting the United Nations and this body so deeply involved in the urgent question of the elimination of those weapons of mass destruction. In fact, thanks to those praiseworthy initiatives of the two Governments, the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons has recently been studied in greater depth at this Conference, at the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere. The extensive discussions have provided an excellent opportunity of clarifying the views of different delegations on this matter and have thus facilitated greatly the framing of an instrument designed to bring about the complete elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

40. Having made those introductory and yet very pertinent remarks, I should like to dwell at some length on the question of banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as it stands today. I would start by expressing a sense of gratification at the fact that the question of elaborating a draft convention on this burning issue has been given high priority

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at the present session of this Conference, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275). We regard that as another attempt by this Committee to respond positively to the universal demand to put an end to the most barbarous means of warfare man has ever possessed.

41. By becoming one of the co-sponsors of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655) the Mongolian People's Republic has, unequivocally expressed itself in favour of the immediate and complete outlawing of those horrible weapons. Precisely for that reason my delegation, like the majority of the members of the Committee, has expressed strong reservations with regard to the manner in which the United Kingdom draft convention (ENDC/255/Rev.1) has proposed that the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons should be tackled. It is the view of my delegation that the treatment proposed by the United Kingdom delegation in the first place would weaken the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) by unnecessary repetition regarding the question of the use of those weapons and, secondly, by separating the biological weapons from the chemical, might in fact give the green light to the horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of chemical weapons.

42. Recently the delegations of some Western countries which support the United Kingdom draft have advanced a number of untenable arguments which in their opinion justify the separate approach taken by those delegations. The inconsistency of those arguments and the dangerous consequences which such an approach might entail have been thoroughly exposed in the speeches of Mr. Roshchin (CCD/PV.461, para.7 et seq.) and Mr. Christov (CCD/PV.462, para.33 et seq.). I have really very little to add. I would only point out that the statements of the United States and United Kingdom delegations give the impression that in advocating separate treatment they proceed primarily from the premise that biological weapons are of doubtful combat value whereas chemical weapons are battlefield weapons which can be used with significant advantage in military operations. That position, the United States representative says, is based on sound military considerations; thus there is an obvious evolution in the arguments, which have acquired a rather surprising and at times quite perplexing military savour.

43. It is said that the more one argues the more he reveals his intentions. Apart from other considerations, the way of thinking which I have just mentioned sows the seeds of suspicion and mistrust. That is natural if one bears in mind the revolting

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fact that chemical warfare was responsible for taking the lives of many thousands during the First World War. Even today chemical agents -- those agents which some even call "humane" weapons -- are being used in our part of the world to kill men, women and children, in gross violation of international law and in disregard of world-wide condemnation. In short, my delegation thinks that it is not the different properties of chemical and bacteriological weapons or the complexities of the verification problems but rather the reluctance of certain Powers to forego some types of chemical weapons that creates the barrier on the way to the prohibition and elimination of those weapons.

44. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons submitted by the nine socialist countries proposes the immediate and comprehensive prohibition of those weapons. It meets the wish of the majority of Members of the United Nations. In preparing the draft the authors have taken into consideration many valuable suggestions put forward at last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. The draft convention is based on the rules of customary international law and on the wisdom of the method, historically vindicated, of treating chemical and bacteriological weapons together, which is sound from political, military and practical points of view. This draft, as Ambassador Sule Kolo of Nigeria put it the other day, "offers a suitable basis for negotiations" (CCD/PV.462, para.87).

45. While we are grateful that the draft convention has received wide support both here and in the United Nations General Assembly, we are aware of the desire of many representatives to see it strengthened further by safeguard clauses. We believe that the draft article on the complaints procedure introduced today on behalf of three socialist countries, including my own, constitutes an important step towards meeting that desire. I have very little to say on this matter after what has been said by Comrade Winiewicz in his lucid speech on the motive and purpose of introducing the new article. I wish only to note that the article in its entirety provides an adequate framework of international safeguard measures involving the United Nations. My delegation, as a co-sponsor, is willing to give very careful consideration to any useful opinions and constructive suggestions designed to elaborate further and improve the article within the given context.

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46. My delegation is fully aware of the fact that the problem of verification in the case of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare is a complicated one. This complexity is probably connected primarily with the fact that many intermediary substances are used for the manufacture of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and in some cases even the agents themselves, are widely used in peacetime. Thus the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is closely connected with the technical, industrial and commercial aspects of peaceful development and with the problems of the health and well-being of man. Furthermore, generally speaking, chemical and bacteriological agents are essentially poisons, and the effects of their use depend entirely on the intention of the user. Chemical and bacteriological agents used for curing man and raising his material and cultural standards can be converted into a weapon of mass and indiscriminate destruction in a matter of several days or even hours.

47. In the case of chemical and bacteriological weapons, verification has an intrinsic imperfection in the sense that on-site inspection is almost impossible in practice and is politically inexpedient. Notwithstanding this, my delegation, like others in this Committee, is of the opinion that the problem of verification is soluble, if not 100 per cent, yet with a great degree of reliability.

48. Taking into account the difficulties involved, the authors of the draft convention have laid special emphasis on the safeguard measures dependent on the good will of States. Bona fides is primarily the expression of the willingness and the capacity of the State concerned to live up to the responsibilities it has assumed under an international treaty. In this connexion special mention should be made of articles 4 and 5 of the draft convention of the socialist countries, which contain a number of important elements of control at the national level. Referring to article 5 of the draft, Mr. Roshchin very pertinently stated

> "The application of this article of the convention will be one of the ways of guaranteeing the implementation of this agreement and of achieving the aim of the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare." (CCD/PV.454, para.64)

49. We submit that the obligations under this article will inevitably call for the adoption of a number of safeguard and verification measures at the national level. These measures may include the establishment of a special government — and I stress government — agency for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the convention.

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A similar suggestion has been made by the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Vratuša (CCD/PV.456, para 35). I think we should go a little further. This question of establishing a national agency can be solved in the spirit of articles 17 and 35 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961[1/], the first of which says that the parties shall maintain a special administration for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Convention, while the latter declares that this should be done with due regard to the constitutional, legal and administrative systems of the parties 50. That agency might be composed of the representatives of important bodies involved in research on and use of chemical and bacteriological agents and substances. To our mind the first to be included should be the representatives of important research institutes in the field in question, national medical and veterinary services, departments responsible for chemical industries, and so on. My delegation believes that the embryo of such an agency might already exist in one form or another in a number of countries.

51. Further measures might include the introduction of: (a) a national system of compulsory registration of the requirements and quantity of production of chemical and bacteriological agents which could be converted into weapons; (b) strict control of the import and export of such agents; (c) strict control of the manufacture, import and export of equipment and apparatus that could be used for the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, etc.

52. My delegation submits that, bearing in mind the similarity of the subject-matter and of the problem of ensuring compliance, we could turn to articles 34 and 35 and other similar articles of the above-mentioned Single Convention to see whether we could borrow some useful ideas or get some hints from them for our purposes. At the same time, however, we would give a warning against making the verification question too complicated by introducing detailed provisions of no practical value. My delegation would like to emphasize once again that the effectiveness of any national control depends solely on the will of the parties concerned faithfully to honour the obligations they assume.

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 520, pp. 204 et seq.

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53. Referring to international safeguard measures, my delegation wonders whether the present provisions of the draft could be further elaborated by the inclusion of a provision concerning a review conference. In view of the well-known specific features of chemical and bacteriological agents the review conference could be held on a regular basis within a certain period of time -- within each period of five years after the entry into force of the prospective convention, say. The clause might envisage that participants in the review conference, if they found it imperative owing to new developments of science and technology in the field concerned, could recommend to the States parties appropriate measures which the parties could apply individually in order to further secure the implementation of the convention.

54. I have expressed by means of thinking out loud some ideas concerning possible ways of strengthening further the safeguard and verification clauses of the draft convention. We would sincerely welcome any comments or remarks on them. We intend to continue our examination of these ideas to see if they can be developed into something more substantial and workable. For our part, we shall study very carefully the interesting suggestions made by the Swedish, Japanese, Yugoslav and other delegations concerning this verification problem.

55. I deem it necessary before concluding my statement to restate the firm position taken by my Government in regard to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We consider it to be the most important instrument embodying the rules of international law prohibiting the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare without any exception. We are opposed to any arbitrary interpretation of the Protocol in an attempt to exempt certain types of so-called incapacitating agents from the prohibitions of the Protocol. It was precisely for these reasons that my country fully supported General Assembly resolution 2603 A(XXIV) reaffirming that the Geneva Protocol embodies prohibition of the use of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It was for the same reasons that the Mongolian delegation asked the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly to make an urgent appeal for universal adherence to that important international instrument.

56. Finally, may I take this opportunity to join comrade Winiewicz in expressing to the United States delegation our sympathy and our regret that technical trouble has curtailed the Apollo 13 mission. We wish the three brave astronauts the best of luck and a safe return to mother earth.

57. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Permit me first of all to welcome the Dep ty Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Poland, Comrade J. Winiewicz, who has come to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. His statement in the Committee and the introduction of a proposal on safeguards for inclusion in the draft convention of the socialist countries on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655) are evidence of the great interest and the ceaseless efforts of the socialist countries aimed at ensuring progress in the cause of disarmament and, in particular, in achieving the complete prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.

58. The Soviet delegation was most interested to listen to Comrade Winiewicz's statement in which, on behalf of Poland, Hungary and Mongolia, he introduced a working paper (CCD/285) containing an important addition to the draft convention of the nine socialist countries. The delegation of the Soviet Union would like first of all to express its gratitude to the authors of the working document submitted to the Committee for the work they accomplished in preparing the aforesaid proposal.

59. The Soviet side regards the introduction of the text of a new article on the question of safeguards into the draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and of the draft resolution of the Security Council on that subject as an important, very useful and timely initiative aimed at facilitating a rapid and positive solution of an urgent problem of disarmament -- the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare. The Soviet delegation declares its full agreement with the characteristic features of this proposal and with the appraisals of its significance which were made this morning by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Winiewicz, and the head of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, Mr. Dugersuren. Further to what has already been said, permit me to draw attention to certain points in connexion with this proposal which in our view are important.

60. During the discussions at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly and at the current session of the Committee on Disarmament on the problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare the delegations of many countries spoke in support of the need for a joint prohibition of these agents and expressed their approval of the approach shown in this regard in the draft convention of the

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nine socialist countries. At the same time the delegations expressed the wish that in this draft the provisions dealing with the safeguarding of compliance with the convention by the parties thereto should be strengthened. Such proposals were put forward, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament, by the delegations of Pakistan, Japan, Nigeria and a number of other countries. In fact, this was one of the most important considerations expressed in regard to the aforesaid draft convention. The addition to the text of the convention proposed by the three countries and the corresponding draft resolution of the Security Council represent a step towards meeting those wishes.

61. Incorporated in the text of the draft convention, the new article will organically supplement the other articles of the convention designed to safeguard the strict implementation of the convention by the signatory countries. Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the draft convention of the nine socialist countries and the new article proposed by the three countries, in conjunction with the proposed resolution of the Security Council, will ensure a reliable system of safeguards and an effective procedure for considering cases of possible violation of the provisions of the convention. Thus there will be established a realistic and workable system of safeguards, which is the only conceivable one for the normal operation of an agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and on their destruction.

62. Indeed, the implementation of the provisions of article 5 under which each State party to the convention undertakes to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures to put a stop to the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and to destroy such weapons, and of article 4, under which the parties to the convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with this agreement by all undertakings and citizens of their respective countries, will ensure the fulfilment of the convention. It should be noted that while the provisions of these articles -- particularly article 5 -- are very categorical, they are at the same time sufficiently flexible to give each government the possibility of itself determining the nature of the safeguards in accordance with the usages and constitutional rules existing in its country. Entrusting the implementation of the provisions of the convention to the national governments within their own countries will create assurances of the implementation of the ban on the development,

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons by any enterprises in those countries, as well as of the destruction or the switching of existing stocks of such weapons to peaceful needs. In the last analysis, as was most aptly noted by the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Christov, on 7 April:

> "After all, it is the governments which, pursuing an armaments policy, take all decisions concerning studies, experiments, development, etc. of chemical weapons. And it is at governmental level that the agreement will be concluded, with the necessary control measures." (CCD/PV.462, para. 50)

63. Thus articles 4 and 5 of the draft convention, as well as article 6 under which States parties to the convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of the convention, are logically supplemented by the provisions of the new article proposed today. This new article, as explained in detail by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic and the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, provides for the right of each party to the convention to lodge a complaint with the Security Council if the party concerned has reason to believe that any other party to the agreement is contravening the convention, and to request the Council to consider the complaint. Each party to the convention accordingly undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which might be undertaken by the Security Council. Thus a thoroughly worked-out procedure is established for investigating possible cases of violation of the convention by the parties thereto. The very fact of the existence of this procedure, apart from its direct purpose, will, we believe, act as a deterrent and will guarantee strict compliance by all the signatory States with the terms of the agreement. On the whole -- and we emphasize this once again -- the new article on safeguards, together with the existing articles concerning assurances of the implementation of the convention, and the resolution of the Security Council strengthening those articles will make the convention a reliable and effective international agreement.

64. Underlying the new initiative of the socialist countries is a sincere endeavour to contribute to progress in reaching agreement on a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare and our desire to show the most constructive possible approach to the solution of that problem. We trust

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

that this circumstance will meet with understanding on the part of the members of the Committee and that in a spirit of co-operation we shall succeed in completing our work on the preparation of an agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

65. In conclusion, we should like to associate ourselves with the words which the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Winiewicz, and the representative of Mongolia, Mr. Dugersuren, addressed to the delegation of the United States and to express the hope that the measures being taken for the return of the spacecraft Apollo 13 will be successfully completed and that the astronauts will return safely to earth.

66. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): First of all I should like to join you, Mr. Chairman, and those representatives who have welcomed in our midst the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Winiewicz. The Czechoslovak delegation would like to congratulate him on his brilliant statement, in which he introduced the working paper (CCD/285) submitted today by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland.

67. The Czechoslovak delegation expressed some of its views on the problems of control of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons in its statement on 2 April (CCD/PV.461, para. 26 et seq.) We are ready to revert to the problem at a later stage if that proves to be necessary. Today we want only to emphasize that we consider the Security Council as being the only body which could be entrusted with investigating possible violations of the treaty and adopting appropriate measures in a situation as complex as the control of the prohibition of production, development and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons would be. We should therefore like to go on record as fully subscribing to the working paper presented today by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland.

68. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I should like to take just a moment to say that we appreciate the words of sympathy which have been expressed by several delegations, led by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Winiewicz, this morning with regard to the difficulties which are being encountered by the current Apollo flight. I do not think we have more recent information than anyone else on this, but it is our understanding that the prospects for the safe return of the astronauts to earth are still excellent. We have always considered that these expeditions represent a common effort of mankind and we are grateful for, and will certainly convey to our Government, the good wishes which we have received here this morning.

69. The CHAIRMAN (India): I would only add to what has already been said by previous speakers, on behalf of my own delegation -- and I am sure I am expressing also the sentiments of all members of the Committee -- that we wish the brave astronauts of the Apollo 13 mission a safe return. I am glad to hear, as I am sure my colleagues are, that the prospects are said to be excellent. We wish the astronauts Godspeed and pray for their safe return.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 464th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M.A. Husain, representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Mongolia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Czechoslovakia and the United States of America and by the Chairman.

"The delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland submitted a working paper (CCD/285) in connexion with the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 16 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.5 p.m.

CCD/PV.465
16 April 1970
ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. R. CARACCIOLO (Italy)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

70-35327

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
Brazil:	Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. T. PETROV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. I. SARKADI
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:	Mr. I. ABE
	Mr. S. YAMADA
	Mr. H. OTSUKA
	Mr. Y. HAMADA
Mexico:	Mr. M. TELLO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. Z. ERENDO
Morocco:	Mr. A.T. BENHIMA
	Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. K. AHMED
	Mr. S.A.D. BUKHARI
	Mr. T.O. HYDER
Poland:	Mr. W. NATORF
	Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO
Romania:	Mr. I. DATCU
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. V. PARASCHIV
	Mr. N. CHILIE
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. T. BENGTSON
	Mr. T. WULFF

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
	Mr. R. HOULISTON
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.R. DAY
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R.L. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (interpretation from French): I declare open the 465th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before calling upon the first speaker on my list, I believe I am speaking for all members of the Committee in assuring the delegation of the United States of America that we all share the feelings of all the American people today and that we are following with the same anxiety the vicissitudes of the drama now going on in space. We admire the courage, the skill and the sang-froid of the three American astronauts, as well as the tremendous recovery organization which has been set up by the Houston Space Centre. We should like to express our good wishes, and we pray that the three astronauts will return to earth safe and sound.

3. I believe that I shall also be reflecting the feelings of the members of the Committee, as negotiations begin today in Vienna between the delegations of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, in expressing our wishes for the success of those negotiations. All who have spoken in this Committee have expressed their interest in those negotiations and we hope that, in so far as it is possible, the Committee will be kept informed of the outcome of the negotiations as well as of the way in which they develop.

4. Mr. KÖMIVES (Hungary): May I first of all, Mr. Chairman, express my thanks to the delegation of Poland for the fact that at the last meeting Mr. Winiewicz, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Poland, came here and stated so eloquently the reasons which had motivated the submission of the working paper (CCD/285) which the Mongolian and Polish delegations, together with the Hungarian delegation, have co-sponsored. In taking that initiative Hungary is following the way on which it embarked and continuing the efforts which it started at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly when it proposed resolution 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185), which received the support of the overwhelming majority of member States. As is well known to members of the Committee, my Government was one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by nine socialist countries at the last session of the General Assembly (A/7655).

5. Although I have very little to add to what has already been said by the other two co-sponsors and by the delegation of the Soviet Union during our last meeting (CCD/PV.464), the Hungarian delegation, too, would like to make some observations on the exchange of views which has taken place on the question on which our attention is now focused -- that is, the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons. The working paper, which takes into account many of the proposals

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

and remarks made in connexion with the draft convention of the nine socialist countries, improves and further strengthens its provisions. It is the opinion of my delegation that the working paper will promote the final elaboration of the draft convention.

6. On the basis of the discussion on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons at the last session of the General Assembly and of the careful study of the exchange of views which has taken place so far, it may be concluded that the overwhelming majority of States favour the complete prohibition and destruction of such weapons. This is natural and understandable because this approach is in full conformity with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) and with the conclusions arrived at in the Secretary-General's report (A/7575/Rev.1).

7. At the same time, it can be said also that delegations which oppose the preparation and conclusion of a comprehensive international instrument and which advocate the prohibition of biological weapons only are trying, in our opinion, on the pretext of scientific and technical complexity and details, to avoid giving a clear reply to the question: do they really intend to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to destroy the existing stockpiles of such weapons?

8. I should not like to be misunderstood by my colleagues. We too are aware of the importance of exploring and clarifying scientific and technical details; we should not like to overlook or ignore them either. However, we must concentrate on the main objective which can be clearly and simply defined: to eliminate chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from military arsenals. My delegation is of the opinion — also expressed by many other delegations — that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles is, not primarily a scientific-technical problem but a political one. We should therefore consider it first of all in its political aspect.

9. As my colleagues may recall, in the course of our discussion we have heard the thesis that a complete prohibition covering both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should not be implemented until a generally-acceptable system and method of verification have been worked out. Many delegations have expressed their views concerning the complexity and difficulty of verification but only a few of them have reached a conclusion in favour of banning the production and possession of biological weapons only. We are fully aware that the working out and functioning of

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

the system and method of verification are inseparable features of any disarmament measure. They should not, however, be the precondition of such measures, particularly if they are extremely complicated and practically incapable of being carried out perfectly.

10. Verification of the observance of such obligations being so difficult and complicated, the co-sponsors of the working paper have sought a system involving the participation of a responsible international organ which could undertake all necessary measures against any would-be violator of the provisions of the convention. This has led the co-sponsors of the working paper to turn to the Security Council, and they were inspired by the verification formula in the United Kingdom draft convention (ENDC/255/Rev.1).

11. Under the provisions of the United Nations Charter the Security Council and its permanent members have been given special rights, and at the same time bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently the complaints procedure under an international convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons must necessarily be connected with the Security Council. Regarding the lodging of complaints with the Security Council, in the opinion of my delegation the Security Council could request those international specialized agencies which possess the necessary technical know-how and experience to take part in the complaints procedure. That is why the Hungarian delegation believes that the suggestions made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at our meeting on 9 April (CCD/PV.463, para. 3 et seq.) deserve careful consideration. My delegation, as one of the co-sponsors of the working paper contained in document CCD/285, would like to express its hope that this initiative will help our Committee to reach agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction.

12. On behalf of my delegation I want to join those delegations which have expressed to the delegation of the United States their sentiments concerning the unexpected difficulties of the Apollo 13 mission. We are following with admiration the heroic fight of the brave astronauts and we wish them a safe return to mother earth.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

13. Before concluding my statement, I should like to address myself to the co-Chairmen of our Committee -- Mr. Roshchin, the representative of the Soviet Union, and Mr. Leonard, the representative of the United States -- on the occasion of the resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Vienna today. I hope that those talks will make a great contribution to easing tension and to the limitation of the nuclear arms race. This could have a favourable impact on the activities of our Committee and also on the international situation as a whole.

14. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Before reading my brief statement today, I should like, on behalf of the Czechoslovak people, to express deep admiration for the efforts of the American astronauts and scientists to bring Apollo 13 back to earth. We hope sincerely that all the efforts will succeed, and our best wishes go to the United States delegation.

15. The eyes of the world turn today to Vienna, which is the venue of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to welcome that important meeting and to offer best wishes for its success. The Czechoslovak delegation to the Committee on Disarmament had expressed its hope for the early inauguration of such talks long before the decision was taken to hold them. We welcomed with gratification the fact that preliminary talks were begun and that, as the participants agreed, they were started hopefully and were fruitful.

16. The idea of holding the talks resulted from realistic considerations derived from experience of the past upward trend in armaments. The spiral of military expenditure in the world has been a constant cause of general concern. At the present rate of growth it is doubled every fifteen years. According to the very interesting SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments, 1968/69, military expenditure on a world scale increased by almost 30 per cent in the previous three years. It has been rightly pointed out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) experts that when a weapon is modernized through research it is often assumed, with no direct evidence, that a potential enemy might have made the same discovery and that it is necessary to take the next step -- that is to proceed with the actual development of the weapon in question. Moreover, every new weapon is an encouragement for the development of a counter-weapon. Thus the development of new weapons seems to be ever more urgent.

(Mr. Vojvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As the SIPRI Yearbook informs us, the United States is spending $50 for research out of every $100 earmarked for military purposes. The situation is certainly much the same in other countries which try to maintain the balance in the level of armaments. In the absence of an international agreement there is little hope of a reversal of that process.

17. The purpose of these remarks is to underline the importance of the agreement sought in the Vienna talks, but also to point out the above facts, since we believe we should be constantly reminded of and mobilized against the growing budgets for military expenditure and that we should give constant warnings about that phenomenon. We have heard it stated here and elsewhere that good results from SALT may have a very favourable impact on the international situation in general as well as on the talks on other disarmament matters. It would be wrong, however, if in respect of SALT we adopted a wait-and-see attitude. In our view we in this Committee can encourage the participants in SALT by exerting maximum efforts to reach agreement on the items on our agenda.

18. On this occasion we should like to mention still another question. As is well known, SALT are closely connected with the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), and more specifically with article VI of that Treaty. We believe that although the Treaty has entered into force we should not relax our efforts to encourage other countries to ratify it. It is a cause of concern to world public opinion that many of the countries capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons have not even signed the Treaty yet. We read in the International Herald Tribune of 6 March 1970 that of those countries capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons only three have ratified the Treaty so far -- namely Canada, Sweden and the German Democratic Republic. We fully share the view that the number of countries which have ratified the Treaty and which fall within the category of what we call threshold States is much too small, although we have no intention of either supporting or refuting the information to the effect that among those States which have ratified the Treaty only three are capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Moreover, as this Committee has heard on several occasions, there exists a possibility of producing uranium-235 by the gas centrifuge method. When speaking before the Committee on 18 February 1970, the Secretary-General of the United Nations drew our attention to the possibility of a military application of the gas centrifuge method of producing enriched uranium, and he stated that he himself had become "concerned about the implications of this development" (CCD/PV.450, para. 19).

(Mr. Vojvoda, Czechoslovakia)

19. Early last March the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands signed an agreement on the production of uranium-235 by that method, and we hear that other countries may adhere to that agreement. Its main significance lies in the fact that it will make it possible to produce fissionable material without any dependence on the main suppliers so far -- that is the greatest nuclear Powers. Certain experts estimate that the power consumption for uranium-235 suitable for the nuclear weapon will be some 10 to 18 per cent of the power needed when using classical methods. We are assured by the parties to the agreement that it contains very specific and very strict guarantees against any form of military use. Nevertheless, we share the view of the representative of Nigeria who said at our meeting on 7 April that in view of the situation new ratifications of the non-proliferation Treaty seemed to be ever more urgent (CCD/PV.462, para. 74).

20. In Europe the Treaty has been ratified so far by fourteen countries, not including nuclear Powers, of which seven are countries of Eastern Europe. A number of European States potential producers of the nuclear weapon, including the Federal Republic of Germany, have not ratified the Treaty. Many countries are postponing ratification until the conclusion of the agreement on safeguards between EURATOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We hope that increased efforts will be exerted so that the agreement on safeguards may be concluded within the shortest possible time. Unfortunately, there are indications that the work on the IAEA safeguards treaty in Vienna has not started as smoothly as would be desirable. Moreover, as far as we know, Euratom has not submitted so far any formal proposals concerning its views on the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Members of our Committee should help in every possible way, either in the IAEA or in Euratom, in the preparation of the safeguards treaty in the nearest future. We should like to urge those European countries which have not ratified the Treaty so far, to do so as soon as possible. Such an act would significantly promote European security and peaceful co-operation among European States.

21. In conclusion, may I once again express our best wishes for the success of the talks in Vienna, which will be transferred later to Helsinki, and greet the delegations of the two Powers opening the talks today.

22. Mr. BOZINOVIC (Yugoslavia): I would like to begin by joining you, Mr. Chairman, and the other delegations in expressing our best wishes for the safe return and safe landing of the brave astronauts of Apollo 13.

23. I would now like to extend a welcome to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Winiewicz, who is taking part at this stage in the work of our Committee, and also to Ambassador Vejvoda, of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and to offer them our best wishes for their complete success in the work of our Committee.

24. I would also like, before proceeding to the subject of my intervention, to mention that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are beginning in Vienna today, and I avail myself of this fact to express the wish of the Yugoslav delegation for their complete success. I would add to that the sincere hope of the Yugoslav delegation that the two parties will find it possible to implement the appeal of the General Assembly to them:

> "... to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems." (resolution 2602 A (XXIV); CCD/275)

25. Last year Yugoslavia stated its position on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the question of the approach to the solution of that problem. Now the Committee is embarking upon a more detailed elaboration of this problem, and the Yugoslav delegation would like to express its views on some aspects which it considers important at this stage of our deliberations.

26. I would like to begin by expressing our appreciation to all the delegations which have already contributed to the clarification of certain aspects of this complex problem. We assume that the majority of countries have come to the conclusion that the present is a propitious moment for comprehensive consideration of the chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons complex with the aim of bringing about the speediest possible solution. Today I intend to deal in some detail with the question of control or verification, and to comment upon some of its aspects. But before I do so I should like to dwell briefly on some theses and arguments which have been brought up during this session and whose over-all effect has resulted in the overemphasizing of difficulties in achieving complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

27. At the beginning of our session our attention was called to the so-called realistic approach, which is aimed at the solution now of the problem of biological weapons only. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been repeatedly

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

reminded of that. If we were to examine this "realism" more deeply we would have to admit that it would not stimulate the necessary progress. Another thesis concerns the alleged impossibility of banning chemical weapons completely now. Among arguments supporting this thesis one asserts that some countries consider chemical weapons important for their defence; another that some countries are already in possession of those weapons; a further one that some countries have programmes for them; and yet another that chemical weapons have been used in the past.

28. Such theses and arguments can hardly be sustained and we fear that their acceptance would lead to further negative conclusions. If one were to follow that logic one could, for instance, bring up the argument that if some countries consider chemical weapons important for their defence others may conclude that other weapons are of similar or even greater importance for their defence, so that they should not give them up. Further, should the possession of stocks of and the existence of production programmes for chemical weapons be a reason for not banning them, it might be concluded that no other weapons in existence should be considered for elimination. This would in fact mean that there could be no real disarmament. The same applies to the assertion that it is difficult to accept a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons because they have been used in the past.

29. Further, there is a tendency to divide chemical weapons into the so-called lethal and non-lethal ones, and also to differentiate between chemical and biological weapons, chemical weapons being regarded as tactical, battlefield weapons, and biological weapons as strategic weapons. Such divisions and differentiations are aimed, it would appear, at facilitating the proof that chemical weapons could not be prohibited completely, thereby ignoring the views expressed by the experts in the Secretary-General's report (A/7575/Rev.1). Divisions with such aims would appear to us to be dangerous. Relevant paragraphs from that report which state that chemical weapons designed only to incapacitate the enemy would be used in conjunction with other forms of attack so that the final effect might be lethal have already been quoted. Besides, the report of the WHO consultants, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, states that:

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

"No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between lethal and incapacitating agents used in chemical and biological warfare, because incapacitating agents can be lethal or permanently disabling under certain circumstances ..."1/

And further:

"For similar reasons, no sharp demarcation line can be drawn between harassing agents and other anti-personnel chemical agents; furthermore, harassing agents may be used in war in conjunction with high-explosive, fragmentation or other weapons to increase the lethal effectiveness of the latter — as distinct from their employment in riot control in order to reduce injuries and to save lives."1/

This conclusion, as well as a similar one in the Secretary-General's report, has obviously been based on the experience acquired in military operations in the First World War, when these weapons were normally used by the major belligerent Powers, and also on later experience when they were used by a militarily superior Power against an unprotected adversary or one who could not retaliate in kind. Many representatives have spoken very convincingly in this Committee about the impossibility of accepting such theses, and generally speaking we share their views.

30. In connexion with the properties of some chemical agents I would like to comment briefly on working paper CCD/283, dated 16 March 1970, submitted by the delegation of the United States. The Yugoslav delegation appreciates this kind of working document in the conviction that it contributes to better understanding of the real conditions in which efforts are being made to achieve complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. However, I would like to say at the same time that from the data given in that document we do not draw the conclusion that it is not possible to prohibit chemical weapons. Nor do we conclude that we could not prohibit nuclear weapons because peaceful nuclear reactors can easily produce nuclear explosives. The production of phosgene and of mustard gas or organophosphorous pesticides, etc. used for peaceful purposes should not necessarily be discontinued. Modern chemistry and physics will probably continue to give us more and more such

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1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p.12.

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

products and mankind will not abandon them because they could be misused. It is the responsibility of the States to see precisely that this does not happen. One of its positive elements is that the chemical means mentioned in the United States working paper exist in various countries, so that the possibility of easy conversion in case of war applies to all of them, the result being a kind of mutual balance or neutralization.

31. I would like now to pass to the question of control or verification in connexion with the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. I do so with the desire to stimulate further the debate in the Committee as regards the complete prohibition of these weapons. This is not an attempt to formulate any proposal; what I would like to do now is to indicate in a preliminary way some elements which may be of interest when clarifying this problem. Before proceeding, I would particularly like to acknowledge the Swedish delegation's untiring efforts and concentration on very pertinent issues. We are greatly encouraged to find that our ideas seem to be very similar to those expressed by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her statement on 9 April (CCD/PV.463, para. 3 et seq.). I should also like to say that my delegation appreciates very much the efforts of the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland in producing working paper CCD/285 of 14 April concerning the so-called complaints procedure, which was so ably presented at our last meeting by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Winiewicz (CCD/PV.464, para. 4 et seq.) and the representative of Mongolia, Mr. Dugersuren (ibid., para. 39 et seq.).

32. The first question to be raised is, I believe, whether control or verification of the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons is necessary. We know that the answer to this question requires more elaboration, space and time. At this stage we will limit ourselves to drawing attention to only two relevant aspects in favour of control. First, intensive activity is required to lessen the high degree of mistrust which exists in the present-day world. One way of contributing to this is probably by ever greater openness, and therefore by some kind of control.

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

The second aspect is that under present international conditions the non-existence of a certain degree of control might either render impossible the achievement of such an agreement or make it unstable, or perhaps burden it with constant suspicions leading to other negative steps.

33. I should like now to deal briefly with the question of whether it would be possible to establish control over the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons under present-day conditions, at the same time making the prohibition both purposeful and widely acceptable politically. In the view of my delegation such control should primarily meet the following requirements:

1. It should fulfil its intent -- in other words, be efficient to the point of not leaving open any possibilities for undetected violations of decisive importance.
2. It should not inflict commercial or other damage through the revealing of industrial, scientific and other secrets.
3. Its functioning should be relatively easy and simple.
4. Expenses for the control should be kept at the lowest possible level.

Those are, in our view, some of the basic requirements which should be observed when trying to establish a functional system of control over the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

34. In order to rationalize our efforts when studying the possibilities and conditions of control over chemical and biological weapons, we believe it to be very important to point out the fact that 100 per cent control over all institutions and installations which could be used for research, development, production and stockpiling is not possible. But at the same time we must also agree that 100 per cent control is not indispensable. The question then arises as to the degree of control, the kind of control and the points at which it would be necessary in order to achieve its end and at the same time be objectively acceptable to the majority of States.

35. There is yet another factor to be recognized a priori, namely, that there could be no rationally implemented control, as it appears, which would render impossible clandestine production and possession of such limited quantities of chemical and biological weapons as have no real military importance but which might be used for so-called terrorist purposes.

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

36. In the event of our adopting those assumptions, which in our view should not present any particular difficulty, it would seem useful to start considering the possibility of establishing a system of measures -- and I should like to underline the word system -- the over-all results of which could represent a sufficient guarantee for each country signatory to such a treaty. I should like to put forward some possible elements of such a system of control. They could be sorted out into four groups or categories which I shall first enumerate and then comment upon in a preliminary way. They are as follows: first, legal measures of renunciation and self-control adopted by each country; second, measures of indirect control to be carried out by an international organ, or by each country individually, primarily on the basis of official statements and analyses of scientific and other relevant public information; third, measures of international control; and fourth, action in case of suspicion of violation or of open violation.

37. The first group of measures would, in our view, consist of the following.

(a) States should enact a law putting under civilian administration or civilian control -- the ministry of health, the ministry of industry or a similar body -- all institutions which are now engaged in research, development and production in the field of chemical and biological weapons. The Yugoslav delegation has already made that suggestion, in its statement of 10 March (CCD/PV.456, para.35). It might be asked whether such a measure would be possible and what its advantages were likely to be. We believe that such a measure is possible. Its introduction would in itself considerably lessen the possibilities for illegal production of chemical and biological weapons. The secret production of such weapons would normally be much easier in military installations, usually not accessible to the public. It should be clear that some of the present military institutions could be converted and could continue to function under civilian control in the field of scientific research for peaceful purposes or for passive protection, in conformity with the treaty regulating that matter.

(b) By another law States should prohibit research for weapons purposes and the development, production and stockpiling of agents for chemical and biological warfare; and they should also take a decision on the elimination of existing stocks and the abolition of testing fields for those weapons as well as all the installations serving the production of those weapons. In the enactment of such

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a law or laws and exception could be made in conformity with the international treaty on the general prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and for the continuation of work on measures for passive protection, and perhaps also an exception for the kind and quantity of agents used for riot-control purposes. The implementation of those laws should, we believe, be left to each signatory State to secure.

(c) The third measure within the scope of this group of measures would be to cease the training of armies in the use of chemical and biological weapons. Consequently all rules and regulations pertaining to the ways of using and conditions for use of chemical and biological weapons should be deleted from all military manuals.

We see this group of measures -- that is, measures of renunciation and self-control -- as being the most important and as the main deterrent to possible violations of the treaty.

38. I would now pass on to the second group of measures: measures of indirect control to be carried out by an international organ or by each country individually, primarily on the basis of official statements and analyses of scientific and other relevant public information. It is known -- and the latest report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute deals at length with this -- that a series of data in each country pertaining to the expenses in certain fields of activity, to the utilization of certain raw materials, semi-finished products and final products, to the development of scientific and research work, and so on, could indicate whether or not there was any activity contrary to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons being carried out. Obviously such a conclusion could be drawn only if the whole field of that activity were under civilian control, as stated in connexion with the first group of elements.

39. The third group of elements relates to measures of international control. It seems to us that several concrete measures might be introduced in order to increase the certainty of the non-existence of prohibited activities. At the same time all such measures should be in conformity with the basic requirements which I spoke of at the beginning of my statement, namely, the requirement not to be intrusive, and so on.

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

(a) One of the measures should be that once complete prohibition had been agreed upon governments should make public a list of all institutions, factories, proving grounds and the like which prior to the ban were engaged in research on, and development, production and testing of chemical and biological weapons, as well as a list of institutions which by their nature could be engaged in such activities.

(b) Governments should on their own initiative provide the possibility for appropriately regulated access to show, if need be, the non-existence of any forbidden activity. That would be the so-called verification by challenge which the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, has suggested (CCD/PV.463, para.18).

(c) Within this group of elements there exist, one should point out, possibilities for control from the air by satellites and other devices for remote detection. We hold that they are not sufficiently known and that it would be useful if countries possessing such technology and experience could agree to put forward their views on the subject.

40. I would now pass on to the fourth group of measures: action in case of suspicion of violation or of open violation -- the so-called complaints procedure. In the event of the existence of suspicion of violation or of open violation of the treaty prohibiting chemical and biological weapons, each State party to the treaty should inform other parties to the treaty. If suspicion only were in question, the States harbouring the suspicion could approach the control organ. Later, or at the same time, depending on the case and on the judgement of the countries concerned, they should address themselves to the Security Council. In order to facilitate preliminary investigation of a possible suspicion that a country was violating the treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, a separate international organ could be set up or the already existing organs or agencies could be utilized for those purposes. Should a country suspect that another party to the treaty was violating it, that State could then present the case, with the necessary data, to that organ. The control organ would then contact the government of the country under suspicion in order to make further preliminary investigations to see whether such suspicions were justified. Provision should be made for the control organ to communicate the results of its investigations to the Security Council. In relation to such a procedure there arises the question of how effectively the Security Council could deal with such complaints, bearing in mind the basic rule of the so-called veto. But that is a separate issue which I do not intend to deal with now.

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

41. Finally I should like in particular to stress and again express our view that control in connexion with chemical and biological weapons is primarily of a political character. Whether the control would be acceptable, to what degree, of what kind it should be, how it would be implemented -- all that would depend above all on whether the political readiness for it existed. We believe that if such political readiness does exist the technical, legal and other problems will be capable of solution without special difficulty.

42. There are many facts which, in our view, reveal a widespread disposition in the world for the complete prohibition and elimination of all chemical and biological weapons and relatively favourable conditions for bringing that about now. The responsibilities of governments, in such conditions, are particularly great. It is up to them to benefit from such circumstances and to achieve the urgent and complete prohibition of all chemical and biological weapons, coupled with a meaningful and purposeful system of control.

43. Mr. DATCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): At the beginning of my statement today I should like to associate myself with you, Mr. Chairman, and with other delegations in addressing to the United States delegation the most sincere wishes of the Romanian delegation that the crew of spacecraft Apollo 13 may overcome the difficulties that it is facing in these dramatic moments. It is with deep emotion and great hope that we follow this extraordinary adventure and the skill of the astronauts. In expressing our deep admiration for the courage, the boldness and the sang-froid of the three men in space we wish them with all our hearts a safe return to earth.

44. I have pleasure in addressing, on behalf of the Romanian delegation, a welcome and best wishes for success to Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, while assuring them of our co-operation in their work in this Committee.

45. At this stage of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Romanian delegation would like to put forward a number of considerations concerning the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The presence of the complex of

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problems posed by chemical and bacteriological weapons on the agenda for disarmament negotiations and the thorough debates which have taken place in the Committee and at the United Nations give striking emphasis to the concern and the efforts of the international community to eliminate once and for all the unprecedented dangers which weapons of mass destruction represent for the life of all nations. On a wider plane, these efforts fit in quite naturally with the noble and constant efforts of mankind to put reason and justice at the foundation of relations between States and to exclude force and the instruments of force -- first and foremost those which are most destructive and most dangerous -- from international life.

46. The standards of contemporary international law, which have taken shape and become recognized after a long historical process throughout which mankind has paid a heavy price in material and human losses, brand as criminal and prohibit the use of any barbaric weapons, condemning such acts as particularly harmful and a threat to civilized values and the vital interests of the peoples. It is obvious that nuclear weapons, like chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, come within the province of these imperative standards. Indeed, owing to their gigantic capacity for destruction and their applicability on both the tactical and the strategic levels, the whole group of chemical and biological combat weapons is considered, from the military point of view, simultaneously with atomic weapons. Together they form the triad A B C of weapons of mass destruction, the so-called "special" weapons.

47. On the political, legal and moral levels, the questions posed by atomic, biological and chemical weapons are substantially the same; in their entirety they come under the group of standards forbidding the use of weapons of mass destruction as being contrary to international ethics and to the standards of law generally accepted by the international community.

48. Considering the great danger the world is facing because of the existence of nuclear weapons, Romania has always maintained and continues to maintain with the greatest determination that it is necessary to take energetic measures with a view to eliminating all means of mass destruction and averting the danger to mankind which they represent. Thus, as we had occasion to declare in our statement on 5 March

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(CCD/PV.455, para.55), the Romanian Government has consistently declared itself in favour of intensifying negotiations on nuclear disarmament, which should enjoy absolute priority within the framework of the negotiations. In this respect the greatest urgency attaches to measures concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the discontinuance of underground tests of such weapons, the establishment of denuclearized zones together with appropriate guarantees, the cessation of production and, finally, the liquidation of stocks of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

49. At the present stage, and more particularly following the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), which constitutes a legal obligation to conduct, in good faith, negotiations likely to lead to real measures of disarmament, there is no justification whatever for delaying negotiations on nuclear disarmament or for the tendency to avoid beginning concrete and effective discussions on this subject.

50. In arguing in favour of the negotiation and implementation of all measures likely to represent concrete steps towards disarmament -- among which we include the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons -- we reiterate our view as to the imperative need to examine in parallel with this and with full consciousness of our responsibilities and of the urgency of the problem, the questions of nuclear disarmament, and as to the absolute necessity to take up again without delay the negotiations on general disarmament, which constitute the mandate and indeed the raison d'être of our Committee. To evade or defer consideration of these major problems would be to make difficult and more complicated as time passed the solution which must be found for the burning problems of disarmament, and would have negative repercussions on the standing of the Committee in world public opinion.

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51. The Romanian delegation approaches the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in the light of Romania's position of principle, according to which all weapons of mass destruction, without any exception whatsoever, must be outlawed and banned from the military arsenals of States.

> "It is high time" — Mr. Nicolae Ceaucescu, President of the Council of State of Romania, emphasized recently — "that all peoples, all governments, all politicians considered with the fullest sense of responsibility the danger which threatens our planet and acted with all possible determination to put an end to armaments and, first and foremost, to eliminate all nuclear, chemical and bacteriological armaments."

The achievement of this objective is of undeniable importance and urgency for the security of all nations and for gradual progress along the road leading to disarmament.

52. As has been pointed out by other delegations which have spoken already, at the present time, when the views of members of the Committee on the different aspects of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are known, our task is still to continue and intensify the efforts aimed at widening the existing zone of agreement; to eliminate gradually and consistently, the controversial elements, so that we may translate the consensus thus achieved into the generally acceptable language of an international legal instrument.

53. The process towards the preparation of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is facilitated, in our view, by the existence of important documents, proposals and suggestions, which form a useful foundation for the development of negotiations based on a wealth of reference material. We have in mind the relevant resolutions on the matter adopted in recent years by the United Nations General Assembly, the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, as well as the full analysis of the problems of chemical and biological weapons which figures in such documents as the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575/Rev.1) of 1 July 1969, the report of a group of consultants of the World Health Organization entitled "Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons", the monograph by the experts of the

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) concerning the question of chemical and biological means of warfare[1], and the draft convention separately introduced by nine socialist countries (A/7655) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1).

54. All these documents, as well as the views expressed both at the United Nations and in the Committee on this whole group of questions or on important technical elements thereof and the suggestions and proposals put forward by various delegations, trace the guide-lines for the agreement which it is our task to establish and throw into relief the principles, ideas and practical methods which must be considered carefully within the framework of the negotiations.

55. Now we should like to consider certain aspects and ideas in this wealth of reference material which seem to us important and useful for our work.

56. First, we wish to stress the necessity to start, when approaching the complex of problems of chemical and biological weapons, from the resolutions of the General Assembly which define the mandate to be fulfilled by the Committee on Disarmament. Thus, in the terms of resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966, the Committee:

> "... has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference" (ENDC/185).

Resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 spells out the mission of the Committee, requesting it to envisage urgently an agreement on this matter and to submit:

> "... a report on progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session" (CCD/275).

57. An aspect of quite special value, both on the plane of principle and on the practical plane, which we would like to emphasize, concerns the relationship between the agreement now in course of negotiation and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The discussions both in the Committee and in the United Nations reveal the existence of a

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broad consensus that the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents, should be the starting point of any measure aiming at the elimination of weapons in this category. That is precisely why we fully share the opinion, supported by a large majority of States, that the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons ought to be considered as being solved by the Geneva Protocol. This interpretation is founded, at the same time, on the qualified conclusions formulated in the report prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in which it is stated inter alia:

> "The momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if the production of these weapons were effectively and unconditionally banned. Their use, which could cause an enormous loss of human life, has already been condemned and prohibited by international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently, in resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations." (A/7575/Rev.1, p.xi)

58. Romania, as a country which was among the first to sign the Protocol, considers that the treaty to be prepared prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons must in no way infringe or affect the validity of that important international instrument which has shown itself to be a political, legal and moral barrier to the use of these weapons. On the contrary, it must contribute to its consolidation and universal application. This could be achieved by the means indicated in resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of the General Assembly which:

> "... calls ... for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol ..." and
>
> "Invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations;". (CCD/275)

59. As has already been emphasized -- and rightly -- by numerous delegations at the current session of the Committee as well as the majority of the States Members of the United Nations, the Geneva Protocol represents an international instrument of incontestable authority, constituting the cornerstone of international legality in this matter; throughout the forty-five years which have passed since its adoption it has withstood all erosion factors, and without that instrument it would be impossible to draw up the new instrument aiming at the de facto elimination of chemical and biological weapons.

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60. The unfailing observance and application of the Geneva Protocol are based, first and foremost, on the principle of the universal value of respect, in good faith, for international treaties and agreements -- pacta sunt servanda. At the same time, the maintenance and consolidation of that instrument stem directly from the sense of the progressive development of the heritage of the principles and standards of contemporary international law, which presupposes, logically and necessarily, that the existing regulations, the legal rules evolved and unanimously accepted, which have entered into the legal conscience of the peoples -- as is the case with the Geneva Protocol -- should be preserved and respected, and that efforts continually to enrich them and give them new value should continue.

61. Therefore, to bear in mind the premise of the validity of the Geneva Protocol is to respond to the major demands of principle which must necessarily be taken into account in negotiating the new instrument. This is, at the same time, a pragmatic way of approaching this question, because the Geneva Protocol is a solid juridical frame for the future treaty, the preparation of which it facilitates. If the norms of international law, and in the first place those defined and enshrined in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, condemn and prohibit recourse to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the next step to be undertaken, logically and necessarily, is the adoption of a measure aimed at the physical elimination of weapons in that category.

62. The discussions in the United Nations, and in particular in this Committee, have revealed the existence of a broad current of opinion in favour of the prohibition of all weapons of this category and of the conclusion of a wide and complete agreement stipulating the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling, in equal measure, of both chemical means of warfare and bacteriological and biological means. Such an approach flows directly from a consideration of the particularly harmful effects of chemical, bacteriological and biological agents, as well as the combined treatment of these weapons as one in important international instruments such as the Geneva Protocol and resolutions of the United Nations.

63. In international law, as regards both the rules of war and the disarmament field -- as a well-known French jurist has said -- bacteriological weapons are closely linked with chemical weapons. This is so also in military practice and military theory. And it is also the case in the opinion of the public, where chemical and bacteriological weapons are united in the same image. This link is not founded solely upon general

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usage or an automatic association of ideas. It is based on powerful reasons of fact connected with the technical and military characteristics as well as the effects of these weapons. This relationship between chemical munitions and biological munitions has led certain authors to call chemical and biological weapons by the single term biochemical weapons.

64. In conformity with its consistent policy of demanding the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, Romania, a co-sponsor of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and on the destruction of such weapons, which was the result of the initiative of the socialist countries during the last session of the General Assembly and was recommended for examination by the Committee, is in favour of the adoption of measures prohibiting chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, as advocated in the document referred to.

65. The Romanian delegation is considering at the same time -- and with an open mind -- all other constructive proposals intended to contribute to achieving a wide measure of elimination of chemical and biological weapons. We are convinced that the controversial aspects, whether of principle or of a technical nature, in the preparation of this treaty will be satisfactorily resolved so that the Committee, thanks to the joint efforts aimed at establishing a generally acceptable agreement, will be able toconcentrate its attention upon other urgent problems which require solution. As has often been emphasized during the debates in this Committee, an important element of the measure prohibiting the group of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is the setting up of an appropriate system of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed by the States parties to this agreement. For its part, the Romanian delegation, at a later stage in our work, will state its views on the control procedure for the treaty under study.

66. The Committee has before it several proposals and suggestions, among which we would like to mention those presented on 14 April (CCD/PV.464) by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Winiewicz, on behalf of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland (CCD/285), and those put forward by the delegations of Yugoslavia (CCD/PV.456, para. 36), Japan (ibid. para. 79) and Sweden (CCD/PV.463, para. 2 et seq), which merit examination with all due care with a view to finding an effective verification system which will have everyone's support.

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67. It is our deep conviction that the elimination for ever of these blind methods of warfare, of all weapons of mass destruction, is the only rational way of saving man from becoming the victim of his own scientific and technological evolution, senselessly controlled and directed.

68. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I would just like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the other speakers this morning for the good wishes which have been extended for the safe return of the crew of Apollo 13. I would also like to say that we appreciate very much the various offers of help in the rescue operations which have been made by a number of countries, including several which are represented here. The Government and the people of the United States are deeply grateful for both the sympathy and the practical assistance which have come from all parts of the world in these difficult moments.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 465th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Roberto Caracciolo, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the Chairman and by the representatives of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and the United States of America.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 21 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon